



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

are usually held valid without personal service. *Loker v. Gerald*, 157 Mass. 42, 31 N. E. 709. *Doerr v. Forsythe*, 50 Ohio St. 726, 35 N. E. 1055. However, actions arising out of an interference with a *res*, resting on a personal duty to make reparation, are clearly actions *in personam*. Accordingly suits for trespass to realty are personal actions. Likewise suits for alimony, even when ancillary to divorce proceedings, are treated as purely personal actions. *Rigney v. Rigney*, 127 N. Y. 408, 28 N. E. 405. In the principal case it would seem that a suit in India against a co-respondent was of the same nature, and that the Indian court could not impose a binding obligation upon the defendant. It seems hard to support the decision on the ground that the defendant as an English subject was, because of his allegiance, under an obligation to obey the Indian laws as to service. Ordinarily the different parts of the British empire are looked upon as distinct foreign jurisdictions. *Emmanuel v. Symon*, [1908] 1 K. B. 302. And there seems no reason to say that the English sovereign has commanded his subjects to obey the laws of a separate part of the empire even if the English court does not afford relief against co-respondents except those who offend against English marriages.

CONTEMPT — ACTS AND CONDUCT CONSTITUTING CONTEMPT — AVOIDING SUBPŒNA. — A witness, expecting to be subpœnaed, but before issue, concealed himself. *Held*, that he is guilty of contempt. *Aaron v. State*, 62 So. 419 (Miss.).

A defendant attempted to persuade one wanted as a witness to avoid service of the subpœna. *Held*, that he is guilty of a misdemeanor. *Rex v. Carroll*, [1913] Vict. L. R. 380.

For a discussion of the important bearing on every-day practice of the principles involved in these cases, see NOTES, p. 165.

CONTRACTS — DEFENSES — IMPOSSIBILITY — DESTRUCTION OF CONTEMPLATED MEANS OF PERFORMANCE. — The defendant contracted to sell onions to the plaintiff, "shipment per P. & O. steamer sailing from Japan about the 8th of September and coming direct to Sydney." No such steamer sailed due to the fault of neither party. The plaintiff, refusing to accept delivery by any other route, sued for failure to deliver according to the terms of the contract. *Held*, that the plaintiff may not recover. *Cornish & Co. v. Kanematsu*, 13 New South Wales, 83.

Ordinarily a party will not be excused from performance of a contract merely because it has become impossible. *Paradine v. Jane*, Aleyn 26; *Rowe v. Peabody*, 207 Mass. 226, 93 N. E. 604. But it is well settled that where performance of the contract depends upon the continued existence of the subject matter, in the absence of any warranty by either party that it shall continue to exist, the destruction of the subject matter without the fault of either party will excuse further performance. *Taylor v. Caldwell*, 3 B. & S. 826; *Martin Emerich, etc. Co. v. Siegel, Cooper & Co.*, 237 Ill. 610, 86 N. E. 1104. The principle of this rule has been extended to cases in which the impossibility arises from the failure of the contemplated means of performance. *Nickoll & Knight v. Ashton, Eldredge & Co.*, [1901] 2 K. B. 126; *Clarksville Land Co. v. Harriman*, 68 N. H. 374, 44 Atl. 527. In the principal case the court bases its decision upon the ground of impossibility of performance. But the case is closely analogous to cases of goods sold "to arrive," in which the words "to arrive" are construed as a condition precedent to the liability of either party under the contract, although the words in the principal case do not so clearly constitute a condition precedent as they do in the "to arrive" cases. *Johnson v. MacDonald*, 9 M. & W. 600; *Rogers v. Woodruff*, 23 Oh. St. 632. The two doctrines rest upon a similar principle, that neither party should be held liable for the failure of that which was, in the contemplation of the parties, the basis of the contract, and the continued existence of which he did not warrant. See 19 HARV. L. REV. 462.